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FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD
James W. Paulsen *
HIS Survey period coincides with a session of the Texas legislature.
Two useful summaries of the 1993 legislative changes have already
appeared in print. The State Bar's section report printed an excellent
summary of the changes, complete with a red-lined set of Family Code Revi-
sions, arranged in numerical order and accompanied by good commentary. '
The Texas Bar Journal also printed a less comprehensive but useful
summary. 2
I. STATUS
In last year's Survey, it was observed that "[p]aternity suits seem to be the
'hot' family law issue of the 1990s, at least so far as Texas Supreme Court
action is concerned."'3 Not only did the state supreme court live up to this
billing in 1993, issuing no less than three decisions, but the Texas legislature
also got in a few licks.
The most significant single decision in the Survey period is the Texas
Supreme Court's ruling in In the Interest ofJ. W. .,4 which sets out the due
process rights of a biological father under the Texas Constitution. Mr. and
Mrs. "T" separated, anticipating that they would get a divorce. Mrs. T.
took up housekeeping with Larry Gibson5 for a few months, then reconciled
with her husband. Some months later, J.W.T. was born. The timing of the
birth, especially in combination with the fact that Mr. T. had a vasectomy
about ten years earlier, pointed to Larry as the father. Blood tests confirmed
this probability to a 99.41% certainty.
The trial court concluded that Family Code section 11.03's list of parties
entitled to bring a suit affecting the parent-child relationship is exclusive,
* B.F.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., Baylor University; LL.M., Harvard Univer-
sity. Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. Thomas A. Gatlin and Paul H.
Cannon, students at the South Texas College of Law, assisted greatly in the preparation of this
Article.
1. See 1993 Legislation Affecting Family Law Practice, 93-2 STATE BAR SEC. REP.:
FAM. L. (John J. Sampson ed. 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Legislation].
2. See F. Lynne Wilkerson, Family Code, 56 TEX. B.J. 904 (1993).
3. James W. Paulsen, Family Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46
SMU L. REV. 1515, 1515 (1993).
4. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1126 (June 30, 1993). The case was spotlighted at 62 U.S.L.W.
2099 (Aug. 17, 1993).
5. The Texas Supreme Court's opinion consistently refers to Larry Gibson as "Larry G."
This protective move seems a bit belated, though, as he was referred to by his full name
throughout the published court of appeals opinion, including the title. See Gibson v. J.W.T.,
815 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991), affid sub nom. In the Interest of J.W.T. A
Minor Child, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1126 (June 30, 1993).
1197
SMU LAW REVIEW
and that Larry therefore lacked standing to sue. 6 The Beaumont Court of
Appeals reversed, reasoning that Larry had been denied his due process
rights under Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution.7 A five-judge
majority of the Texas Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals and
affirmed, placing its reliance specifically and exclusively on the Texas Consti-
tution's principal8 due process guarantee. 9
The Texas Supreme Court's ruling is interesting not only for its family law
substance, but for its constitutional law and procedural implications. Sub-
stantively, In the Interest ofJ. W. T resolves a clash between the rights of a
biological father and the rights of the family. The majority opinion focuses
on the rights of the biological father, pointing out that the state has estab-
lished procedures for permitting, or forcing, a biological father to enjoy the
benefits or shoulder the burdens of paternity. Contrary to the traditional
restrictions stemming from Lord Mansfield's Rule, 10 either husband or wife
may now sue to deny the paternity of children born during their marriage. t"
6. This section, amended by the 1993 legislature in a manner not directly relevant to this
issue, reads in part:
(a) An original suit affecting the parent-child relationship may be brought at
any time by:
(1) a parent of the child;
(2) the child (through a representative authorized by the court);
(3) a custodian or person having rights of visitation with or access to the child
appointed by an order of a court of another state or country or by a court of this
state before January 1, 1974;
(4) a guardian of the person or of the estate of the child;
(5) a governmental entity;
(6) any authorized agency;
(7) a man alleging himself to be the biological father of a child who has no
presumed father filing in accordance with Chapter 13 of this code, but not
otherwise;
(8) a person who has had actual possession and control of the child for at least
six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition;
(9) a person designated as the managing conservator in a revoked or unrevoked
affidavit of relinquishment under Section 15.03 of this code or to whom consent
to adoption has been given in writing under Section 16.05 of this code; or
(10) a person with whom the child and the child's guardian, managing conser-
vator, or parent have resided for at least six months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition and the child's guardian, managing conservator, or parent is
deceased at the time of the filing of the petition.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
7. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty,
property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of
the law of the land.").
8. Article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution also contains a due process provision,
stating in relevant part that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him,
in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 13 (emphasis added). The majority opinion, however, relied exclusively upon
the due course of law provision of article I, section 19. See supra note 7.
9. The court could have chosen to write on "open courts" or "equal rights" grounds,
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13, since the application for writ of error also was granted on those
grounds. See 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1007 (July 1, 1992).
10. As first set out in Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777), Lord Mansfield's rule
prohibits either husband or wife from denying the paternity of a child born during marriage,
thus requiring third-party testimony to establish non-access. The rule was repudiated in Texas
in 1975. See Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975).
11. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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Biological fathers also may sue or be sued to establish paternity if there is no
marriage.' 2 The mother or the state may even combine a suit to disestablish
the presumed father's paternity with a suit to establish the biological father's
paternity. I3 The statutory exception in Texas provided that biological fa-
thers could not sue to establish their paternity if the child was born to a
marriage and the presumed parents (the husband and wife) did not deny
paternity. This prohibition stemmed from the fact that the Family Code
gives a biological father standing to sue only if the child has no presumed
father, 14 and that actions to establish paternity are also limited to situations
in which there is no presumed father.' 5
The majority of the court, in an opinion written by Justice Lloyd Doggett,
reasoned that the prohibition on suits by biological fathers may have "had
merit in an earlier era when the true biological father could not be estab-
lished with near certainty and when illegitimacy carried a significant legal
and social stigma."' 6 Citing data documenting "[s]ignificant twentieth cen-
tury changes"' 7 in this attitude, Justice Doggett concluded that "this is no
longer the case."'18 For this reason, and keeping in mind that the best inter-
ests of the child are always paramount,' 9 the court ruled that the biological
father's due process rights had been violated.
The decision contains a very significant caveat. Since the interests of the
child always are the primary concern, not every biological father would have
the right to sue. Rather, "a father's interest in establishing a relationship
with his biological child is constitutionally protected when accompanied by
the father's early and unqualified acceptance of parental duties." 20 Elaborat-
ing on this "link between the rights and responsibilities of parenthood,"'2 1
the court quoted with approval a Louisiana Supreme Court decision giving a
biological father the right to establish paternity if the father "show[s] that he
has taken concrete actions to grasp his opportunity to be a father and that
12. Id. § 13.01(a).
13. This result was approved in Attorney General of Texas v. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d 952
(Tex. 1992). See Paulsen, 1992 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 1515-17.
14. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § i 1.03(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1994). The text is set out in note
6.
15. Before its 1993 amendment, Family Code section 13.01 provided that "[a] suit to
establish the parent-child relationship between a child who has no presumed father and the
child's biological father may be brought by the mother, by a man claiming to be or possibly to
be the father, or by any other person or governmental entity having standing to sue under
Section 11.03 .... TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (amended 1993) (emphasis added). The
section now simply provides a statute of limitation (two years after the child becomes an adult)
without trying to specify the persons entitled to sue. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon
Suop. 1994).
16. In the Interest ofJ. W.T., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1133.
17. Id. at 1129. Justice Cornyn's dissent is particularly critical of the majority's analysis
on this point, stating that "[ulpon examination, the history and demography of divorce, single
parenting, and out-of-wedlock births are remarkably complicated, and are subject to consider-
able debate inside and outside academia." Id. at 1279-80 (Cornyn, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
18. Id. at 1133.
19. Id. at 1130-31 (citing Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1965)).
20. Id. at 1131.
21. Id. at 1129.
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there is a potential for him to make a valuable contribution to the child's
development." 22 In J. W. T, Larry had arranged and paid for prenatal care
and acknowledged responsibility for child support, thus evidently demon-
strating parental interest and potential for contribution to the child's life
sufficient to claim a constitutional right to sue.
In dissent, Justice Enoch emphasized "the significant countervailing con-
stitutional interests of the family to be free from unwanted interference and
attack by strangers. ' 23 He warned that "there are contradictory interests
between the putative biological father and the family" 24 and that the major-
ity's holding "would invite actions by persons whose only purpose is to
break up the family to satisfy a jealous or revengeful feeling."' 25 Justice
Cornyn echoed this concern: "Unlike many children, J.W.T. has two par-
ents who are willing and eager to provide stable [sic] home. Larry, his puta-
tive father has sued for the right to enter this circle, against the wishes of
J.W.T.'s mother and presumed father. Conflict and discord are
inevitable." 26
Family law issues aside, In the Interest of J. W. T. is also a major statement
of the Texas Supreme Court's version of the "new federalism," the use of
state constitutional provisions to guarantee rights greater than those set out
in the United States Constitution. As the United States Supreme Court has
executed a sharp right turn on civil rights issues in recent years, a number of
state courts, with Texas "in the mainstream of this movement,"' 27 have uti-
lized state constitutional provisions to provide greater guarantees than af-
forded under federal law.2 8
Historically, state constitutional provisions, including article I, section
19,29 have been construed by Texas courts in conformity with their federal
counterparts. While In the Interest of J. W. . is far from being the first case
22. In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 550 (La. 1990) (quoted in In the Interest of
J. W T., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1131). The Louisiana court continues, explaining that "the mere
existence of a biological link and fitness will not sustain the father's interest; it is defeasible if
not preserved by dedicated, opportune fatherly action." Id.
23. J.W.T., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1135 (Enoch, J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. In the Interest of J. WT., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1280 n.10 (Cornyn, J., dissenting).
27. LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). A 1985 symposium
issue of the Texas Law Review contains a good blend of national and Texas-specific articles on
this trend. See Symposium: Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959
(1985). In some areas of criminal law, Texas possibly is the leader in developing innovative
uses of state constitutional guarantees. See, e.g., Neil Colman McCabe, State Constitutional
Law: Separation of Powers in Criminal Cases, THE CHAMPION, November 1993, at 38 (men-
tioning Texas as the only state high court to sustain a state separation-of-powers challenge to a
speedy trial act).
28. This process of creating state constitutional rights independent of the federal "floor"
is not without its pitfalls. See generally Neil Coleman McCabe and Catherine Greene Burnett,
A Compass in the Swamp: A Guide to Tactics in State Constitutional Law Challenges, 25 TEX.
TECH L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).
29. See JAMES C. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY AND
LITIGATION MANUAL 102 (1987) ("As a rule .... Texas courts have declined the opportunity
to fully define the scope of state procedural due process because of their frequent reliance on
the fourteenth amendment.").
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in the more recent contrary trend, J. W T serves as a clear signal that the
current Texas Supreme Court has decided to add due process guarantees to
the list of civil rights on which it has now decided to chart its own course. 30
Under Fourteenth Amendment analysis, a deeply divided United States
Supreme Court ruled in Michael H. v. Gerald D.31 that state laws cutting off
the rights of a biological father do not violate due process guarantees. While
the Beaumont Court of Appeals in J. W. T admitted that Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D. was "directly on point" (though declining to follow it), 32 the Texas
Supreme Court's majority opinion in J. W. T. engages in a detailed dissection
of the United States Supreme Court's reasoning, to the point that Justice
Comyn's dissent suggests that the majority is "almost coy ' 33 about the
depth of disagreement. Nonetheless, it is clear that the opinion ultimately is
reached "wholly under our Texas due course of law guarantee, which has
independent vitality, separate and distinct from the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."' 34 The ruling in J. W. T. is
critical, as it should effectively insulate the result from review by the United
States Supreme Court. 35
The ruling in In the Interest of J. W. T does raise some serious issues in
state-federal relations, as well as in the proper role of the legislature and of
the Texas Supreme Court. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion from the
wording and interaction of the statutes at issue that the Texas legislature
considered and deliberately subordinated the rights of biological fathers to
the rights of the individuals constituting the family unit.36 That conclusion
is reinforced by the fact that the Texas legislature, in its most recent session,
rewrote some of the statutory language at issue in J. W T, but in such a way
as implicitly to disapprove of the result. 37 The accusations of Justice Enoch
30. Speaking for the majority, Justice Doggett correctly points out that the United States
Supreme Court recognized as early as 1982 that "Ithe language of the Texas [due course]
constitutional provision is different from, and arguably significantly broader than, the language
of the corresponding federal provisions." In the Interest ofJ. W T., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1132
n.22 (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982)). In dissent,
however, Justice Cornyn points out with equal accuracy that, only one year earlier, the major-
ity opinion's author had reiterated the traditional rule that "we rely heavily on the literal text."
Id., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1279 (quoting Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 19 (Tex. 1992)).
In view of the textual similarity between the federal and state provisions, and the lack of
definitive "legislative history" on the state provision, the dissent proceeds to make a reasonable
case for a parallel reading.
31. 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989).
32. Gibson, 815 S.W.2d at 867.
33. In the Interest ofJ. WT., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1281 (Cornyn, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 1132.
35. Id. at 1283 (Cornyn, J., dissenting) ("This is precisely what has happened here: aware
that its interpretation of the Texas Constitution is final, the court has elected to ignore the
holding in a controlling case under the United States Constitution and make Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion the law of Texas.").
36. See supra notes 11 through 15 and accompanying text.
37. The majority opinion in J. W T. points out the fact that some of the policies favoring
rights of non-parents are given statutory protection, quoting the provision that "a grandparent
or other person deemed by the court to have had substantial past contact with the child sufficient
to warrant standing" may intervene in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. J. W. T., 36
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1130 n.16 (quoting Texas Family Code section I 1.03(c)) (emphasis added).
While the italicized language is unaffected by 1993 statutory revision, identical language in
1994] 1201
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that "[u]nder the guise of denial of procedural due course of law, the Court
is in fact creating a substantive due course of law interest, ' 38 and of Justice
Cornyn that "the court substitutes its own unfounded notions of what is
good for Texans for the judgment of our elected representatives in the legis-
lature" 39 may be overstated. Justice Cornyn's use of the Dred Scott decision
as a prime example of the dangerous road down which substantive due pro-
cess may lead even borders on the inflammatory. 0 Few would argue, how-
ever, with the proposition that complex questions of changing social mores,
or of balancing the rights of family members against those of "outsiders" are
more commonly seen as legislative, rather than judicial matters.
In J. W. T., Texas followed the lead of the Louisiana Supreme Court in
finding broader due process rights for biological fathers than those afforded
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Whether this is
the beginning of some sort of a trend remains to be seen, although arguably
similar decisions have been issued by California 4 and Minnesota 42 courts.
Indeed, even in the short time since the opinion's issuance, J. W. T. has
caught the attention of another state supreme court, though how closely it
was read is not certain. In B.H. v. KD. ,4 the North Dakota Supreme Court
applied that state's version of the Uniform Parentage Act44 and declined to
find that a biological father had due process rights in a situation similar to
that present in J. W T The majority opinion cited a Texas court of appeals
decision specifically disapproved of in J. W. T. ;45 the dissent, without bother-
ing to mention that the decision was grounded on state constitutional
grounds, cites J. W T with approval. 46 Thus, to put it mildly, the issue is not
yet fully settled.
Questions of paternity and federalism aside, the Texas Supreme Court's
section 11.03(b), regarding original suits seeking managing conservatorship, was deleted. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
The 1993 legislature also rewrote portions of Family Code section 12.06(a), one of the provi-
sions at issue in J. W. T., in such a way as to indicate that it was aware of developing case law.
The revision does not, however, directly address J. W. T. concerns. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 12.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (now providing that "a governmental entity" is entitled
to deny a presumed father's paternity, and omitting restrictive language) with Attorney Gen-
eral of Texas v. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1992) (reaching much the same result as a matter
of judicial interpretation); see also Charles G. Childress, 1993 Legislation, supra note 1, at 19
(stating that the 1993 revision of § 12.06(a) "more or less codifies" the Lavan decision).
38. J.WT., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1134 (Enoch, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1288 (Cornyn, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 1281-82 (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)). The opinion adds
the stifling of labor law reform and other progressive legislation to the protection of slave
"property" as examples of the dangers of judicial application of substantive due process. Id. at
1282.
41. See Michael M. v. Giovanna F., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460 (Cal. App. 1992).
42. Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
43. 506 N.W.2d 368 (N.D. 1993).
44. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-01 to 14-17-26 (1991 and Michie Supp. 1993).
45. The North Dakota Supreme Court cited Jack v. Jack, 796 S.W.2d 543, 550 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) for the proposition that standing determinations are not gender-
based, but presumption-based. See B.H. v. K.D., 506 N.W.2d 368 at 376. However, Jack was
disapproved on the standing question by the J. W. T majority. See J. W. T, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
at 1133 n.26.
46. B.H. v. K.D., 506 N.W.2d at 383 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
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opinion in J. W T. also puts a more mundane, but still serious, issue of proce-
dure into high relief. The majority opinion and Justice Enoch's dissenting
opinion in this case were released on June 30, 1993.47 Justice Comyn's dis-
senting opinion followed some two-and-one-half months later, on September
15.48 As this Survey article was completed, in mid-November, 1993, the bar
still awaited promised separate concurrences by Chief Justice Phillips and
Justice Hecht.
The practice of issuing opinions piecemeal is not completely unprece-
dented in the Texas Supreme Court 49 or other Texas courts.50 It does seem
to be a comparatively new practice, however,5 1 and it is one with which this
author strongly disagrees. The sole apparent advantage of issuing a majority
opinion in a case with the notation that concurring or dissenting opinions
"will follow" is that the majority decision issues in a more timely manner.
Indeed, J. W. T. 's author has been vociferous in his criticism of court delay, 52
and J. W. T. had taken nearly a year from granting of an application for writ
of error to decision.5 3
Promptness, however, is not always a virtue. The disadvantages of the
piecemeal approach, at least for the outside legal community, are legion. A
principal problem is that, because court rules require that a motion for re-
hearing be filed "within fifteen days after the date of rendition of the judg-
ment or decision of the court,"'54 the losing party may be forced to file before
knowing the positions of all members of the court on the issue. In J. W. T,
for example, even after filing a motion for extension of time, the losing law-
yers were forced to file before knowing the positions of one-third of the
court.
47. SeeW. T., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1126, 1133, 1136.
48. See id. at 1277, 1288.
49. See, e.g., Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1993); Diamond Shamrock Ref. &
Mktg Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1992); Scott v. Twelfth Court of Appeals, 843
S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1992); Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1992); Evans v.
Pollock, 796 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1990); Orange County v. Ware, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 252 (Dec.
31, 1990), withdrawn, 819 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1991); Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
412 (Dec. 31, 1992), withdrawn, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1304 (Sept. 29, 1993); Bandy v. First State
Bank, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 643 (Apr. 22, 1992), withdrawn, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 843 (June 10,
1992); Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 358 (Mar. 28, 1990), with-
drawn, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 609 (June 20, 1990). In another opinion issued the same day as
J. W. T., the court also indicated that a dissenting opinion would follow. See Sage St. Assocs. v.
Northdale Constr. Co., 863 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1993).
50. See, e.g., Eason v. Eason, 860 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993,
n.w.h.).
51. So far as the author has been able to determine though a LEXIS survey, with the
exception of an isolated 1886 case, the recent spate of piecemeal decisions dates from mid-
1989. See Mitchell v. M-K-T RR Co., 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 526 (July 5, 1989), withdrawn, 33
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 245 (Feb. 21, 1990); Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1986).
The Texas Supreme Court also engaged in the practice to a limited extent in the 19- 'teens and
early '20s, with some bad results. See infra note 57.
52. See, e.g., Delaney v. University of Houston, 835 S.W.2d 56, 61 (Tex. 1992) (Doggett,
J., concurring); Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 793, 799 (Tex. 1992)
(Doggett, J., dissenting and concurring).
53. The application for writ of error was granted July 1, 1992. See 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at
1007 (July 1, 1992).
54. TEx. R. App. P. 190(a).
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A further problem then occurs. The court could, as apparently will be the
case in J. W. T, decline to decide the motion for rehearing until all opinions
issue in the case. This makes some sense, as the dissenting or concurring
opinions conceivably could bring forth some new argument which should be
addressed in the majority opinion. On the other hand, so long as the motion
for rehearing is not overruled, the decision is not final and precedential. 55
The court's haste in issuing the majority opinion therefore does neither the
litigants nor the general public any ultimate good. In addition, should the
majority decide to rewrite its opinion to accommodate arguments raised in
the further opinions that follow, a likely result in this case, 56 the original
opinion might be withdrawn or modified, with further delay and a possible
further rehearing.
One option, of course, is for the court to deny the rehearing before receiv-
ing the "opinions to follow." If this course were followed, however, the
court would lose its jurisdiction over the case, and at least arguably would
lose its ability to modify the language of the majority opinion. Legal pub-
lishers might also be confused. For example, Texas's unofficial official pub-
lisher, West Publishing Company, follows the practice of placing opinions in
the advance sheets after all rehearing motions are denied. If this should
occur before all opinions are issued, West either would need to keep a tally
sheet to determine when all dissenting and concurring judges have "reported
in," or it might (most likely by accident) print the opinions as a continuing
saga in successive volumes of the Southwestern Reporter,57 as the Texas
Supreme Court Journal has already been forced to do. 58 This might well
result in all sorts of difficulties in legal research, among the least of which is
the likelihood that J. W. T does not clearly fit within any single one-year
Survey period for SMU's Annual Survey issue.59
55. See TEX. R. App. P. 186(a) (providing that "[a]t the expiration of fifteen days from the
rendition of judgment if no motion for rehearing has been filed, or at the expiration of fifteen
days after overruling the motion for rehearing, the clerk shall issue and deliver the court's
mandate in the cause .... ).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 60-61. As this Survey went to press, the author's
prediction of a withdrawn and reissued majority opinion was confirmed. See In the Interest of
J.W.T., A Minor Child, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 496 (Feb. 2, 1994).
57. This problem apparently occurred in the early years of the twentieth century. In at
least two cases, separate opinions issued after the majority opinion appear in the Texas Reports
version of the case, but not in the Southwestern Reporter. Compare Stamford Compress Co. v.
Farmer's & Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 105 Tex. 44 (1912) and Westerman v. Mims, Ill Tex. 29
(1921) with Stamford Compress Co. v. Farmer's & Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 143 S.W. 1142
(Tex. 1912) and Westerman v. Mims, 227 S.W. 178 (Tex. 1921).
The problem was not solely the court's, however. At this time, West Publishing sometimes
appeared to "jump the gun," publishing opinions before rehearings were denied, as evidenced
by the fact that supplemental opinions on denial of rehearing sometimes appear at different
places in the Southwestern Reporter than do the majority opinions. See, e.g., Koy v. Schnei-
der, 218 S.W. 479 (Tex.), reh'g denied, 221 S.W. 880 (Tex. 1920); Tyler Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Biard & Scales, 171 S.W. 1122 (Tex. 1914), reh'g denied, 171 S.W. 1200 (Tex. 1915).
58. The majority opinion and Justice Enoch's dissent appear in issue no. 32a. See J. W. T,
36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1126, 1133. Justice Cornyn's dissenting opinion is the only matter of
substance in issue no. 36. See J. W T, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1277.
59. A similar problem was encountered by the Texas Tech Law Review, which printed a
student Note keyed to the now-withdrawn opinion. See Chester A. Caldwell, Note, Texas
Expands Biological Fathers' Rights to Rebut the Marital Presumption and Establish Parental
[Vol. 471204
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Perhaps the worst problem, however, is that the practice of issuing opin-
ions as continuing serials unnecessarily exposes the Texas Supreme Court's
internal decision-making processes to public scrutiny. A popular political
maxim holds that, just as one who loves sausage should never watch it being
made, so should one who believes in the political process never watch the
legislature in action. A reasonable corollary to that rule might be that public
respect for the judiciary seldom is increased by the chance to watch contro-
versial court opinions in the process of formation. The Texas Supreme
Court in recent years has shown a marked tendency to withdraw and reissue
decisions with comparatively minor changes in wording. This tendency will
only be accentuated by issuing dissenting and concurring opinions after the
majority opinion is in print. The authors of court opinions typically refer to
and refute arguments raised in concurrences and dissents, and J. W. T is no
exception. The majority opinion repeatedly refers to Justice Enoch's dis-
sent 6° and even slips up on at least one occasion and foreshadows the argu-
ment in Justice Cornyn's then-unissued dissent. 6 1 In all likelihood, once the
concurring justices weigh in, the majority, and perhaps the dissenting, opin-
ions will be withdrawn, edited, and reissued.62 This will lead to inevitable
speculation about the meaning of the changes, no matter what the court
intended when the original opinions were withdrawn. 63
A second paternity decision issued by the Texas Supreme Court during
the past year, Dreyer v. Greene,64 skirts the constitutional issues that J. W T
addressed directly. The primary question in Dreyer was whether a paternity
suit brought by the children is barred by a divorce decree finding the hus-
band and wife to be the parents of the children. The Family Code provides
that a paternity suit "is barred if final judgment has been rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction: (1) adjudicating a named individual to be the bio-
logical father of the child."' 65 The Texas Supreme Court, joining the trial
Rights to Children with Presumed Fathers: In the Interest of J. W. T, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1126
(June 30, 1993), 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 193 (1993).
60. See, e.g., J.W.T, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1131 n.18.
61. In one footnote, Justice Doggett refers to "[t]he dissenting justices" and correctly an-
ticipates the substance of Justice Cornyn's dissent although only Justice Enoch's dissent had
issued at that point. Id. (emphasis added). A less clear example is Justice Doggett's footnote
refutation of the argument that the majority's decision would jeopardize the adoption process,
which appeared to come out of the clear blue sky until Justice Cornyn's dissenting opinion
made that claim some two-and-one-half months l.ter. Compare J. W. T, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at
1133 n.25 with J. W T, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1287 (Cornyn, J., dissenting).
62. The percentage of opinions later withdrawn, when originally issued with concurring
or dissenting opinions "to follow," is quite high. See supra notes 49 and 51.
63. As a general matter of interpretation, a withdrawn opinion "should, in deference to
the court's wishes, be treated as if never rendered." Mixon v. Wallis, 161 S.W. 907, 911 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1913, writ ref'd). The temptation to enter into such speculation,
however, is almost irresistible. See, e.g., James W. Paulsen, Jensen III and Beyond: Exploring
the Community Property Aspects of Closely Held Corporate Stock in Texas, 37 BAYLOR L. REV.
653, 656 n.8 (1985) (containing an extensive bibliography of articles written about one, two or
all three versions of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107
(Tex. 1984)).
64. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 57 (Oct. 27, 1993).
65. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.44(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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court and court of appeals, 66 found that the divorce decree barred such a
subsequent suit.
The facts were not appealing, so far as the children's right to sue were
concerned. In her divorce petition, Kathleen Gresham Dreyer swore under
oath that she and her then-husband were the parents of three children, in-
cluding twin boys, of the marriage. When she had some initial problems
collecting child support, Kathleen reiterated the claim in a support order. A
deal was then struck in which her ex-husband conveyed some land, which
turned out to be virtually valueless because of an undisclosed tax lien, in
settlement of support obligations. 67 Kathleen, as the next friend of the
twins, sued to establish that Philip Greene was the biological father. The
circumstances suggest a calculating maneuver on Kathleen's part to get
child support from whomever was available to pay, and the Texas Supreme
Court seems to have thought as much, commenting that "only after Thorne
[the ex-husband] had difficulty meeting his obligation did Kathleen sue
Philip to establish his paternity of two of her three children. '68
The decision of the Texas Supreme Court is very limited. Citing three
prior court of appeals rulings, 69 the majority simply reasoned that "parents"
and children "of the marriage" were affirmative statements of the biological
relationship. 70 The Court sidestepped the most serious question: since the
children were not represented independently in the divorce, their constitu-
tional rights might be implicated. The court held that constitutional com-
plaints were waived because they were not raised at trial. 7' Moreover, in a
concluding footnote, the court "express[ed] no opinion" on the question of
whether the children could challenge the paternity finding by bill of
review. 72
The decision drew a dissent by an odd assortment of judges: Justice Gam-
mage, Chief Justice Phillips, and Justice Doggett. Chief Justice Phillips dis-
sented solely on the question of whether a boilerplate recital in a default
decree could be considered an adjudication of biological paternity. 73 Justices
Gammage and Doggett agreed; however, drawing an explicit parallel with
the concern for the constitutional rights of the biological father expressed in
66. The lower court opinions are discussed in last year's Survey. See Paulsen, 1992 An-
nual Survey, supra note 3, at 1517-18.
67. These facts do not appear either in the court of appeals or Texas Supreme Court
opinion. They are, however, apparently true. See Paulsen, 1992 Annual Survey, supra note 3,
at 1517 n.26.
68. Dreyer, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 58 n. L
69. Espree v. Guillory, 753 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ);
Thompson v. Thompson, 572 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ); Walters v.
Walters, 565 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
70. Dreyer, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 57.
71. Id. at 58.
72. Id. n.2.
73. Phillips's dissent is limited to Part I of Justice Gammage's opinion, which analyzed
the legislative history of the Family Code section barring paternity actions in cases with prior
final judgments "adjudicating a named individual to be the biological father of the child." Id.
at 59 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.44(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
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J. W T,74 they concluded that the majority opinion rides "roughshod over
the rights of the minor children for whose protection the legislature enacted
the paternity provisions in question."'75
The Texas Supreme Court's third paternity decision of the Survey period,
County of Alameda v. Smith,76 involves the effect of refusal to submit to
paternity testing. Rod Smith refused to comply with two court orders to
submit to blood, body fluid or tissue testing in a suit brought by the Texas
Attorney General's office, on behalf of California authorities, under the Re-
vised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.77 The trial court,
relying on Family Code section 13.06(d)'s language that such refusal shifts
the burden of proof,78 entered judgment that Smith was the child's biological
father and should pay child support. The court of appeals reversed, reason-
ing that, under section 13.02(b), 79 the state still had the burden of introduc-
ing evidence sufficient to support a default judgment.80 The Texas Supreme
Court resolved the apparent discrepancy in the statutes by ruling, in a per
curiam opinion without argument, that the legislature intended the burden
to be on the person refusing to submit to paternity testing.8' The court was
careful to point out that no constitutional issues were raised by the parties.8 2
While not directly relevant to the issues raised in County ofAlameda, it is
worth noting that the 1993 legislature made several changes in the law gov-
erning paternity suits. Blood or other scientific tests now must exclude 99
percent (rather than the old 95 percent) of the male population as potential
fathers in order for the results to be admitted in evidence8 3 or shift the bur-
den of proof.84 In a strange twist on normal procedure, the party seeking to
establish paternity still retains the right to open and close, even if the burden
of proof has been shifted because of a positive paternity test.85
The statute of limitations for a paternity now clearly runs two years after
the second anniversary of the date the child becomes an adult, although suits
are permitted before birth.86 A new section encourages early suits by pro-
viding that the Attorney General's office be notified whenever items relating
74. Dreyer, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 59 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 58.
76. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1325 (Sep. 29, 1993).
77. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 21.18 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
78. Id. § 13.06(d) ("A party who refuses to submit to paternity testing has the burden of
proving that the alleged father is not the father of the child.").
79. Id. § 13.02(b)(2) ("[I1f any party refuses to submit to court-ordered paternity testing,
upon proof sufficient to render a default judgment the court may resolve the question of pater-
nity against that party.").
80. Smith v. Drake, 852 S.W.2d 82, 85-86 (Tex. App.-Waco), rev'd sub nom. County of
Alameda v. Smith, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1325 (Sept. 29, 1993). The petition did contain a sworn
statement by the child's mother attesting to Smith's paternity. The statement was not intro-
duced into evidence, however, possibly because it was made on "best information and belief."
Id. at 84.
81. County of Alameda, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1325.
82. Id. n.1.
83. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.02(a), 13.04(g) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
84. Id. § 13.05(c).
85. Id. § 13.06(g).
86. Id. § 13.01(a).
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to a child's father are not completed on a birth certificate.87 Child support
can now be collected, retroactive to birth, regardless of when the paternity
suit is filed.88 Negotiation of child support obligations in such instances is
now encouraged by statute.89
II. SUPPORT
The Survey period contains a good deal of activity, both judicial and legis-
lative, on the subject of child support. Support at the high end of the eco-
nomic spectrum commanded the most attention. The Texas Supreme
Court's opinions in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez90 and a companion case9l dealt
with a question of statutory construction arising from 1989 revisions to sup-
port guidelines. The question, to what extent "lifestyle" factors as opposed
to the child's demonstrated needs can be taken into account when the obli-
gor's net monthly resources exceed $4000, would not have arisen before
1989, since the 1987 guidelines specifically included lifestyle as a factor to be
considered under these circumstances. 92 In the 1989 revision, however, this
reference was deleted. 93
At the court of appeals level in Rodriguez, the principal question was
whether the legislature meant to eliminate lifestyle factors from the child
support calculus at the upper end of the income scale. One might reasonably
conclude that the elimination of the lifestyle language in the 1989 revision
was a clear signal of the legislature's intent, as the court of appeals so held.94
Things are not quite that simple, however. The Texas child support statutes
set out a number of relevant "evidentiary factors,"' 9" including the generic
phrase, "any other reason or reasons consistent with the best interest of the
child, taking into consideration the circumstances of the parents."' 96 This
language might well leave room for consideration of "lifestyle" factors.
The Texas Supreme Court had no difficulty disposing of the lifestyle ques-
tion, so far as the 1989 amendments were concerned, concluding that "[w]e
agree with the court of appeals that above $4000 of net monthly resources,
additional child support may only be awarded based on the needs of the
87. Id. § 13.015.
88. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.44(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
89. Id. § 14.808.
90. 860 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1993).
91. Berger v. Berger, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 924 (May 19, 1993), withdrawn, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 2 (Oct. 6, 1993).
92. Act of Nov. 1, 1987, 70th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 73, § 4, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 226-27,
amended by Act of Sept. 1, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 617, § 5, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 2035.
93. The relevant section now provides in part that, for net monthly resources above $6000
(a 1993 revision from the previous $4000), "[w]ithout further reference to the percentage rec-
ommended by these guidelines, the court may order additional amounts of child support as
appropriate, depending on the income of the parties and the proven needs of the child." TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.055(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
94. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 834 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992), rev'd on
other grounds, 860 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1993).
95. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.054 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
96. Id. § 14.054(15).
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child." 97 The decision went further, though, in a process of reasoning that
"shocked the child support community." 98
Unfortunately, one needs to do a little math to understand the cause for
shock. Once the court of appeals in Rodriguez concluded that lifestyle fac-
tors could not be included in "high end" child support, it subtracted the
$800 "presumptive" award authorized by the Family Code (20 percent of
net resources, to $4000) from the $1,742.17 actual proven needs of the
child. 99 The remaining amount, $942.17, was all that could be awarded in
addition to the $800 presumptive award.' °°
The Texas Supreme Court, however, took a different approach. The high
court began by observing that the trial court is not required to make specific
findings regarding factors considered in the presumptive award, and that
such items as ability to pay and amount of access to the child might be
considered. 10 Therefore, to the Texas Supreme Court, "the presumptive
award necessarily encompasses a number of factors that are not limited just
to the needs of the child."' 0 2 To the Texas Supreme Court, "the $800 pre-
sumptive award is just that-a presumptive award."10 3 Thus, there is no
reason to assume it is based on need and no reason to deduct it from the
child's total proven need in determining the propriety of the remainder of
the child support award. The court therefore "delinked needs of the child
and the child support calculated under the guidelines,' °4 at least for the
presumptive award.
This new method of calculation led directly to a different result in the
case. To reiterate a bit, the total child support award was $2500. If the $800
presumptive child support is not necessarily related to the child's needs, only
$1700 must be justified by proven need. Since this amount is less than the
$1742.17 in actual need found by the trial court, the original award was
justified.
The result, while not prohibited by the language of the child support stat-
utes, surely is counterintuitive. One would think that the child's needs
ought much more to be the touchstone at lower levels of available resources
than at the high end. At any rate, the ink hardly had a chance to dry on the
Rodriguez slip opinion before the legislature acted. The Family Code now
provides that "the entire amount of the presumptive award be subtracted
from the proven total needs of the child." 105 Should there be any lingering
doubt, the amendment also adds that "in no event may the obligor be re-
quired to pay more than an amount equal to 100 percent of the proven needs
of the child as child support."' 10 6
97. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d at 417.
98. Harry L. Tindall, 1993 Legislation, supra note 1, at 32.
99. Rodriguez, 834 S.W.2d at 372.
100. Id. at 374.
101. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d at 418.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Tindall, 1993 Legislation, supra note 1, at 32.




Two caveats should be added. First, the 1993 legislative change, while
limiting all support to the child's proven needs, also increases the presump-
tive amount from $4000 to $6000 per month,'0 7 a change which should
"now cover 97% of all obligors."' 1 8 Second, while the principal holding of
Rodriguez is already history in that one now can consider only the "needs of
the child," one should not forget the Rodriguez court's footnote observation
that "needs" is an imprecise term that "is not limited to bare necessities of
life."' 0 9 Thus, says the high court, "'needs of the child' includes more than
the bare necessities of life, but is not determined by the parents' ability to
pay or the lifestyle of the family. In determining the needs of the child, we
direct courts to continue to follow the paramount guiding principle: the best
interest of the child."110
While Rodriguez and associated developments surely are the most promi-
nent developments in the support area over the past year, a number of other
cases and statutory changes also deserve brief mention. Contractual agree-
ments for child support continue to generate a respectable amount of litiga-
tion. In Giangrosso v. Crosley,1 1 Pamela Giangrosso argued that a prior
order containing no requirement that she pay child support barred a request
by her former husband to modify the order to seek support. The First Dis-
trict Court of Appeals in Houston began by noting that a court ordinarily
cannot modify the terms of a contractual child support agreement, absent
contract-based grounds such as fraud, accident, or mistake."12 Nonetheless,
if the agreement is incorporated into a court order, the court has authority to
modify, because "[p]arties cannot by contract deprive the court of its power
to guard the best interest of the child."'' 3 Since this agreement was incor-
porated into a court order, entered after divorce, contract questions did not
enter in. 1"4 Conversely, in Hollander v. Capon, " 5 the same court held that a
suit for breach of a child support contract not incorporated in a court order
is governed by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to written con-
tracts"16 rather than the special ten year statute for support orders. 117
While court-ordered child support terminates on the death of the obligor,
contractual support can follow the payor to the grave. 1 8 Lake v. Lake " 9
illustrates the point in a somewhat unusual fact setting. A contractual child
107. Id. § 14.055(a).
108. Tindall, 1993 Legislation, supra note 1, at 32.
109. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d at 417 n.3 (citing Courville v. Courville, 568 S.W.2d 719, 720
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
110. Id.
111. 840 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
112. Id. at 768 (citing Hoffman v. Hoffman, 805 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, writ denied).
113. Leonard v. Lane, 821 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1991, writ
denied).
114. Id.
115. 853 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
116. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(3) (Vernon 1986).
117. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.41 (Vernon 1986); see also infra note 131.
118. See Hutchings v. Bates, 406 S.W.2d 419, 420 (Tex. 1966).
119. No. 05-92-02111-CV, 1993 WL 342588 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Aug. 23, 1993, n.w.h.).
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support agreement provided that if the payor died before the support obliga-
tions terminated, the contract obligation would be satisfied by conveyance of
an equity interest in a piece of real estate. Before death, however, the agree-
ment was modified by an addendum transferring the real estate interest by
quitclaim, together with the deletion of the provision just mentioned with an
explanation that the parties "are relieved of their respective obligations and
responsibilities as set forth in those paragraphs."'' 20 Another provision,
however, making the contractual obligation of support binding on " 'heirs at
law, next of kin, executors, administrators, and other personal representa-
tives,' ",121 was not struck.
The Dallas Court of Appeals acknowledged the statutory mandate, which
provided that, "[u]nless otherwise agreed to in writing or expressly provided
for in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by...
the death of a parent obligated to support the child." 122 It is at least argua-
ble that the intent of the transaction, when viewed as a whole, was to release
the payor from obligations after death in exchange for transfer of the agreed-
upon property during life. The Dallas court, however, construed the agree-
ment strictly as written. The undeleted proviso that the agreement was
binding on heirs, taken in conjunction with the statement in the addendum
that "[a]ll other portions of the ...[a]greement are hereby affirmed and
ratified by the parties,"' 23 combined for a summary judgment against the
estate.
Lewis v. Lewis,' 24 a case involving the proper application of offsets to a
claim for child support arrearages, merits a brief note. In Lewis, the obligor
conceded nonpayment of child support, but claimed an offset for support
paid while a child was living with him. The Family Code provides for such
offsets or counterclaims during a period when the custodial parent volunta-
rily relinquishes control of a child to the obligor.' 25 The obligor claimed an
offset for one child for thirty-five months, while the claim was only for a
twenty-five month period. The evidence indicated that the father was keep-
ing track of voluntary oversupport and subtracting it from later support pay-
ments. Nonetheless, citing Chief Justice Phillips's dissent in Williams v.
Patton, 26 to the effect that the trial court "acts as a mere scrivener"'127 in
tallying up arrearages and credits, the Houston Court of Appeals (14th Dis-
trict) ruled that each month of unpaid support was a separate claim, and
that only financial contributions made by the obligor during that month
would be considered as offsets. 128 Although the decision is not altogether
clear, the amounts exceeding support obligations on a month-by-month basis
apparently should not be considered, because they are voluntary payments
120. Id. at *4 n.1.
121. Id. at *2.
122. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(d) (Vernon 1986).
123. Id. at *4.
124. 853 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
125. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.41(c) (1986 and Vernon Supp. 1993).
126. 821 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1991).
127. Id. at 153 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
128. Lewis, 853 S.W.2d at 854.
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pursuant to a common law obligation of support, and thus "not necessarily
to be offset against the statutory obligation enforced by a court order." 129
Since the trial court had for some reason not permitted evidence on offsets,
the Houston Court of Appeals (14th District) remanded for further
scrivening.
The 1993 legislature made a number of statutory changes of relevance to
the general issue of child support. In addition to the changes in the support
guidelines already mentioned, lawmakers made it easier to calculate and col-
lect arrearages. Not only is it now permitted to cumulate judgments for
child support arrearages, ' 30 but the former statutory provision limiting judg-
ments to arrearages owing for less than ten years has been replaced by a
four-year window for filing motions to confirm after emancipation or the
date the obligation terminates. 1 3' Arrearages may be collected by wage
withholding, even if reduced to judgment, 1 32 as can health insurance pay-
ments,133 even if the obligor employee works outside the state.134 Employer
fines for noncompliance have been increased, from $50 to $200 per viola-
tion. 1 35 A voluntary program will also encourage employers to report the
names of all new hires. 136 In other action, delinquent child support obligors
can no longer receive state grants or loans, or bid on state contracts.1 37 A
new statute permits delinquent support obligations to be set off against debts
owed by the state, with a limited exception for workers' compensation
awards, 138 and delinquent child support payments may also be collected
from insurance awards. 139
While most statutory changes reflect the state's continuing "get tough"
attitude toward delinquent child support obligors, some changes are
designed to streamline the process. A new child support review process,
based on principles of negotiation and mediation, is being implemented. 140
Personal checks must now be accepted unless the obligor has a history of
writing bad checks. '4' Child support is also moving into the computer age,
with a new provision for payment by electronic funds transfer.142
Last, but assuredly not least, so far as legislation is concerned, Texas be-
came the first of the major industrial states to adopt the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act. 143 This is particularly appropriate, because University
129. Id. (quoting In re McLemore, 515 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no
writ)).
130. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.41(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
131. Id. § 14.41(b).
132. Id. § 14.43(a)(4).
133. Id. § 14.43(1).
134. Id. § 14.43(h).
135. Id. § 14.43(n).
136. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 76.011 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
137. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.52 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
138. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 76.0041 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
139. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.972 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
140. Id. §§ 14.801-.809.
141. Id. § 14.0501(d).
142. Id. § 14.0502.
143. Id. §§ 21.01-.43.
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of Texas law professor John J. Sampson was co-reporter for the uniform act
and Harry Tindall of Houston was an active participant in the drafting pro-
cess. 144 For the same reason, it should not come as a surprise that much of
the act already will be familiar to Texas practitioners. The long-arm provi-
sions are modeled on Texas law, as are the provisions for continuing exclu-
sive jurisdiction. 145 Out-of-state support orders can now be enforced
directly against Texas employers or through state enforcement agencies. 146
Finally, the Survey period contains a healthy crop of quasi-criminal deci-
sions on contempt orders. Ex parte Hall,147 a decision issued by the Texas
Supreme Court in April 1993, is a primer on settled law, albeit in a some-
what unusual context. By prenuptial agreement, Craig Hall agreed to pay
MaryAnna's living expenses of $23,982.75 per month, as well as $675 per
month for her two adult children. When the marriage went sour, the court
set temporary spousal and child support at the agreed figures, together with
arrearages and credits apparently calculated on the same basis, despite
Craig's argument that the amounts were "exorbitant." 1 48 Craig did not pay
and, after the usual formalities, the judge ordered him jailed for contempt.
The Dallas Court of Appeals upheld the order on habeas challenge, except
for the portion of the order awarding MaryAnna attorney fees for any
habeas corpus proceeding. 49 The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, striking
down the order in its entirety. The reasons were simple. Under the Texas
Constitution, imprisonment for debt is unconstitutional. 50 This does not
affect an ordinary contempt order in a family law case, however, because
such orders arise from legal duties owed as a result of the parties' status, not
their private contracts.' 5' An order for temporary spousal support'5 2 or
child support' 53 therefore is enforceable by contempt. A contract for sup-
port, however, is different. It is still enforceable. However, to the extent
that it exceeds a spouse's legal duties, such an agreement is enforceable only
as a debt through ordinary legal processes, and not by use of the court's
contempt power. ' 54
In Ex parte Hall the record made it clear that the court did not exercise
any independent judgment; in fact, the court "expressly stated that it was
simply enforcing the parties' agreement."' 5 5 The order contained none of
the required findings, and arrearages were calculated without any eviden-
144. See Sampson, 1993 Legislation, supra note 1, at 66.
145. Id.
146. Wilkerson, supra note 2, at 906.
147. 854 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1993).
148. Id. at 657.
149. Id. at 657-58.
150. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18 ("No person shall ever be imprisoned for debt.").
151. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Vernon 1986) (providing, in part, that
"[e]ach spouse has a duty to support the other spouse" and that "[e]ach parent has the duty to
support his or her child"); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 40 S.W.2d 46, 49-50 (Tex. 1931).
152. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.58(c)(2), (f) (Vernon 1986).
153. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.11(a)(2), (h) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
154. See, e.g., Ex parte Hatch, 410 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. 1967).
155. Hall, 854 S.W.2d at 658.
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tiary basis.156 Accordingly, use of the contempt power was inappropriate,
and Mr. Hall was ordered discharged. 157
Ex parte Garrison,' 8 a habeas corpus case from the Houston Court of
Appeals (1st District), points out a problem that deserves the Texas Supreme
Court's (and perhaps the legislature's) prompt attention. The obligor was
confined for failure to pay child support, though he had already served the
criminal portion of his jail time. He sought habeas corpus relief based on an
affidavit claiming that he had no money or job, no employment prospects, no
possibility of a loan from family and friends, and so forth.' 59 Under 1987
amendments to the Family Code, the defense of inability to pay is rigidly
controlled by law. The statute specifies that inability to pay is an affirmative
defense to a contempt motion. 160 The defense is not available unless some
evidence is introduced,' 6' and the obligor is required to prove inability to
pay by a preponderance of the evidence.1 62
Although a plain reading of these statutes would lead to the conclusion
that the legislature intended obligors to shoulder some very substantial bur-
dens in proving inability to pay, the Houston Court of Appeals (1st District)
simply sidestepped the issue.163 These rules, Justice Bass reasoned, do not
apply at all in original habeas proceedings.' 64 Thus, as stated in the second
paragraph of the opinion:
The issue is not whether relator was able to pay child support as it came
due, or at the time of the hearing on contempt. The issue is whether
this Court will grant habeas corpus relief when its original habeas
corpus jurisdiction is invoked and the relator, by uncontroverted affida-
vit, testifies he is presently unable to pay child support arrearage be-
cause he has no money or property that can be sold or mortgaged; he is
unemployed and has no prospects of obtaining employment; friends,
relatives, and financial institutions have refused to loan him money; and
he knows of no other source from which he can obtain money to pay
the arrearage, and such testimony is corroborated by a period of
incarceration. 165
Viewed in this way, all objections to the obligor's release from confine-
ment could be disposed of in short order. The first apparent obstacle was the
fact that the obligor provided no statement of facts from the trial court hear-
ings. Justice Bass reasoned that evidence of inability to pay some months
earlier might be relevant, but was hardly necessary, to show the obligor's
"present, uncontested inability to pay" at the time of the habeas corpus pro-
156. Id.
157. Id. at 659.
158. 853 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.], orig. proceeding).
159. The facts stated in the affidavit, as summarized by the court, are set out infra in the
text accompanying note 165.
160. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.40(g) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
161. Id. § 14.40(h).
162. Id.
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ceeding.166 The court distinguished a prior opinion requiring a statement of
facts in order to consider a habeas corpus petition, also from the Houston
Court of Appeals (1st District), 67 because the prior case dealt with waiver
of counsel, not inability to pay.
The other problem was that the court of appeals appeared to be determin-
ing fact issues, something the court acknowledged was beyond its author-
ity.' 68 Initially, the answer seems quite simple. Justice Bass noted that the
Houston Court of Appeals (1st District) decided, in two previous opin-
ions,169 that an uncontradicted habeas corpus affidavit coupled with a period
of incarceration conclusively establishes the facts necessary to justify re-
lease. 170 He further observed that even the affidavit of an interested party
can be given conclusive effect "when a party has the means and opportunity
of disproving the testimony, if it were not true, and fails to do so."' 7
The majority's reasoning quickly begins to unravel, however, when one
considers the points raised in Justice Camille Dunn's dissent. Justice Dunn
pointed out that the record presented to the court included a list of property
awarded to the obligor in the divorce: cash, retirement plan benefits, a car,
and a bass boat, and that the affidavit did not explain what had happened to
those assets.172 Justice Dunn further noted that the obligor brought forth no
statement of facts from the original contempt hearing, and that there was no
way of knowing that the trial court had not already considered the same
arguments."73 Justice Dunn also intimated that the majority decision con-
tradicted prior decisions from the Houston Court of Appeals (lst District)
holding that it is the child support obligor's burden in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding to bring forth a statement of facts, 174 and that in the absence of a
statement of facts, it would be presumed that there was evidence to support
the trial court's judgment that the obligor had the ability to pay.' 75 The
overall effect, she concluded, was to "impermissibly shift the burden of
bringing forth the statement of facts to the real party in interest"' 76 and that
"[i]t is unconscionable to require the real party in interest to controvert the
relator's general affidavit regarding inability to pay when the real party in
interest does not have the burden of proving the relator's ability to pay."' 177
166. Id. at 787.
167. Ex parte Occhipenti, 796 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, orig.
proceeding).
168. Garrison, 853 S.W.2d at 787 n.3 (quoting Ex parte Ramzy, 424 S.W.2d 220, 227 (Tex.
1968, orig. proceeding) (Norvell, J., concurring)).
169. Ex parte Mabry, 792 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. pro-
ceeding); Ex parte Peters, 770 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig.
proceeding)
170. Garrison, 853 S.W.2d at 787.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 788-89 (Dunn., J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. See Occhipenti, supra note 167.
175. See Ex parte Nivens, 592 S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, orig.
proceeding).




In this author's opinion, Justice Dunn has the better argument. Issues of
present inability to pay are best handled by the trial court, which has fact-
finding capabilities not available to a court of appeals. In this case, one
hardly could expect Garrison's ex-wife to address, by affidavit, the question
of whether Garrison still had the property he was awarded in the divorce.
Such questions are the gist of evidentiary hearings. In consequence, to say
that the affidavit is uncontradicted, when the proceeding offers no opportu-
nity to test the truth of the obligor's conclusory statements, seems disingenu-
ous. And if real parties in interest respond to conclusory affidavits with
equally conclusory counter-affidavits, based on what little they know about
the obligor's financial status after six months in jail and without the opportu-
nity to ask the obvious questions, one wonders what the Houston Court of
Appeals (1st District) will do to determine whether the counter-affidavits
raise a fact question.
The merits of the case aside, Ex parte Garrison points out two major
weaknesses in the Texas appellate system. First, our appeals courts are far
too reluctant to reduce inconsistency within their own decisions. It is diffi-
cult to argue with Justice Dunn's observations that, while the decision is
consonant with some prior Houston Court of Appeals (1st District) rul-
ings,17 8 it is arguably in conflict with others.179 The decision of the Houston
Court of Appeals (1st District) not to grant en banc rehearing, on a five-to-
four vote in which all members of the Garrison panel voted for rehearing
except for the author, 180 is disappointing.
Even worse, the decision highlights a continuing conflict between two ap-
pellate courts with concurrent jurisdiction over the most populous urban
area in the state. In announcing its decision, the Garrison court announced
that "we decline to follow"'18 Ex Parte King,182 a 1991 decision on highly
similar facts from the Houston Court of Appeals (14th District). Con-
versely, in Ex Parte King, the Houston Court of Appeals (14th District) sim-
ilarly announced that "[w]e decline to follow the First Court of Appeals,' 8 3
citing the two decisions relied upon in Garrison. Such intercircuit conflicts
are regrettable in all cases. They become intolerable when, as in this case,
the conflict exists between two appellate courts with overlapping
jurisdiction.
The fact that this blatant and unresolved conflict between Houston's two
courts of appeals involves an original proceeding adds some peculiar twists.
Since the question is one of procedure in original mandamus proceedings,
trial courts will not be forced to engage in a guessing game as to which court
of appeals, by random draw, will hear an appeal from their decision. Nor,
unfortunately, can the Texas Supreme Court act to correct the problem by
granting an application writ of error on "conflict" grounds.
178. See supra note 169.
179. See supra notes 174-75.
180. Garrison, 853 S.W.2d at 788.
181. Id.
182. 819 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding).
183. Id. at 946.
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This habeas corpus face-off between Houston's two appellate courts does
create a different problem - a blatant invitation to forum-shop. By joint
court order, original proceedings currently are divided between Houston's
two appellate courts in strict numerical rotation, odd-numbered cases to the
Houston Court of Appeals (1st District) and even-numbered cases to the
Houston Court of Appeals (14th District).18 4 In view of the current un-
resolved conflict, and the high probability that any child support habeas
corpus relator will be released if the case is filed in the Houston Court of
Appeals (1st District), one might well begin to see attorneys loitering in the
hallway outside the clerk's office, waiting for the next odd number to roll
around.
All in all, Ex parte Garrison signifies a sad situation. Recalcitrant child
support obligors are released, contrary to the probable intent of the statutes,
without a fair evidentiary hearing. Conflicts within the Houston Court of
Appeals (1st District) are unresolved because of the court's reluctance to
take cases for en banc review. 185 And conflicts between Houston's two
courts of appeals will continue to bedevil the bench and bar, though the last
problem ultimately is attributable to the legislature's unthinking decision to
give two independent courts of appeals overlapping trial court jurisdiction, a
situation not contemplated in any rational theory of precedent.
Although not as significant as Garrison, in Ex parte Howell 186 the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals (1st District) denied relief to an obligor who claimed
the child support enforcement order was defective and that he was denied a
jury trial. The "defect" was a supposed failure to comply with the statutory
requirement that the order set out "the time, date, and place" of each viola-
tion.1 87 Since the order gave the total amount in arrears and a four page
exhibit gave a list of dates, amounts owed, and zeros in the "amount paid"
column, and that payments were to have been "THRU Harris County Child
Support," the court concluded that substantial compliance with the statute
had been achieved.' 8  So far as a jury trial was concerned, the Houston
appeals court felt bound by the Texas Supreme Court's recent decision in Ex
parte Sproull. 189 Since the confinement requested did not exceed six months,
the charge was not "serious," and a jury trial was not required. 190
III. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
Termination and adoption have not been particularly active areas of the
case law during the last Survey period, although the 1993 legislative session
184. See Order Implementing Docket Equalization Practices for Original Proceedings
(First and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals, Feb. 8, 1990) (copy on file with the author).
185. Cf O'Connor v. First Court of Appeals, 837 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1992) (confirming the
right of a justice of the First Court of Appeals, not a member of the issuing panel, to issue a
written dissent from the denial of en banc rehearing).
186. 843 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
187. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.33(a) (Vernon 1986).
188. Howell, 843 S.W.2d at 243.
189. 815 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam); see also Paulsen, 1992 Annual Survey, supra
note 3, at 1535.
190. Howell, 843 S.W.2d at 244.
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did make some noteworthy changes in the statutes. Parental rights can be
terminated when a parent has "failed to support a child in accordance with
his ability during a period of one year" 191 and termination is in the child's
best interests. Two cases issued during the Survey period discuss this provi-
sion, with moderately differing results. In the Interest of Z W C 192 involved
a support order of $200 per month; In the Interest of R.R.F 193 involved a
support order of $100 per month. No payments were ever made by either
obligor. The principal question in each case was who had the burden of
proving the obligor's ability to pay during the period in question.
In Z W. C. the obligor had been in and out of jail on several occasions
since the issuance of the support order. In a 1989 decision, Yepma v. Ste-
phens,194 the Austin Court of Appeals ruled that proof that an obligor was in
prison for some portion of the twelve-month period, and therefore could not
pay, together with no contrary evidence, constituted a fact issue sufficient to
avoid termination. 95 Relying on this ruling, the mother in Z W C. argued
that the obligor should be presumed able to meet his support obligations for
a twelve-month period during which he was able to spend all or part of each
month out of jail. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals did not agree. Rather,
the Fort Worth court reasoned that, since the party seeking termination
bears the burden of proof' 96 and must produce clear and convincing evi-
dence' 97 that termination is justified, that party must show that the obligor
had the ability to pay, but did not pay, for twelve successive months. Absent
affirmative evidence of ability to pay, termination was not proper.
In R.R.F the Corpus Christi court arrived at the opposite conclusion in a
situation where neither party put on evidence of ability to pay child support.
First, the court suggested that the original child support order contained an
implicit finding of ability to pay.' 98 Second, the court turned to the law
governing contempt proceedings as an applicable analogy.1 9 As discussed
earlier in this Article, 200 inability to pay is an affirmative defense to a con-
tempt motion. The defense is not available unless some evidence is intro-
duced, and the obligor must prove inability by a preponderance of the
evidence. 20 1 Since "[iun either situation, the rights of the non-paying parent
are in jeopardy, either by incarceration or by loss of parental rights," the
Corpus Christi court ruled that inability to pay should be considered an af-
firmative defense. 20 2
191. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(1)(F) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
192. 856 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, n.w.h.).
193. 846 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
194. 779 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
195. Id. at 512.
196. See, e.g., State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979).
197. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.15(b) (Vernon 1986).
198. R.R.F., 846 S.W.2d at 68.
199. Id.
200. Relevant portions of the statutes are set out earlier in this Article, in connection with
discussion of recent habeas corpus decisions. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. R.R.F., 846 S.W.2d at 68.
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The issue is not altogether clear. In the author's opinion, however, the
Fort Worth court has the better of the argument. The Texas Supreme Court
has ruled that "involuntary termination statutes are strictly construed in
favor of the parent. '20 3 The Code requires that "each finding required for
termination of the parent-child relationship must be based on clear and con-
vincing evidence."' 2°4 This is a specific and solitary statutory exception to the
Family Code's general rule that court findings may be based on a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 20 5 Ability to pay surely is "a finding" required to sup-
port termination. The Corpus Christi court thus seems to have imported by
analogy what has been prohibited by the explicit terms of the Family Code.
The Corpus Christi court's claim that the original support order contains
an implied finding that the obligor was able to pay the support is undoubt-
edly true,20 6 but it is irrelevant to the issue in a termination proceeding. The
support order only contains an implied finding as of the time the order is
entered; it cannot predict the future. The termination statute is extremely
clear as to the time period involved: "a period of one year ending within six
months of the date of the filing of the petition. '20 7 This directs the court's
attention to the period of time for which support was not paid, not the time
the support order first was entered. All in all, the author agrees with the
Austin court's observation in Yepma that the statute "requires evidence es-
tablishing that the parent had the ability to pay child support during the
relevant period. '208 Since that opinion was written by Justice Gammage
before he took his current job as a justice of the Texas Supreme Court, the
opinion deserves a little more consideration than it was given by the Corpus
Christi panel.
A voluntary termination issue deserves brief mention. In Kawazoe v. Da-
vila, 20 9 the mother secured the father's consent to termination of parental
rights, and for thirteen years she led him to believe that his rights had in fact
been terminated. When the mother sued to collect past due child support,
the San Antonio appeals court held that the father's signing of the voluntary
termination papers, combined with the mother's misrepresentations, es-
topped her from collecting arrearages. 210 In so doing, the San Antonio court
explicitly followed 21 the lead set by the Tyler Court of Appeals in LaRue v.
LaRue,212 a case reported in last year's Survey.213
Two matters of termination procedure also should be noted. The Family
203. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985).
204. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.15(b) (Vernon 1987) (emphasis added).
205. Id. § 11.15(a) ("Except as provided by Subsection (b) of this section, the court's findings
shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence under rules generally applicable to civil
cases.") (emphasis added).
206. Under the Family Code, the court is required to consider a parent's ability to contrib-
ute in setting child support. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.052(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
207. Id. § 15.02(1)(F).
208. 779 S.W.2d at 512 (emphasis added).
209. 849 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, n.w.h.).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 910.
212. 832 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ).
213. See Paulsen, 1992 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 1538.
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Code requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem in cases in which ter-
mination of the parent-child relationship is sought unless the court finds,
among other possibilities, that the interests of the child are adequately repre-
sented.214 In Chapman v. Chapman 215 the Waco Court of Appeals held that
"[iut would be a rare situation" in which such a finding could be made, if the
adverse parties were the child's parents, and that Chapman was not such a
case.
2 16
In Azbill v. Dallas County Child Protective Service,217 the Dallas Court of
Appeals tried, with very limited success, to unravel a legal tangle caused by
the trial court's failure to issue an order for separate trials. The Dallas
County Child Protective Services (CPS) started termination proceedings
against the Azbills, who then cross-filed for divorce in the same action. The
court held separate trials, terminating parental rights after a jury trial, and
then, at a later date, granting the divorce. Two judgments, each apparently
final, were issued. The Dallas court observed that the record reflected the
trial court's undoubted intent to have separate trials on the two issues. Un-
fortunately, under Texas Supreme Court authority in the Aldridge case, 218
failure to enter a separate trial order 219 results in a presumption that the
judgment disposes of all issues.
The Dallas court's decision is a primer on the final judgment rule in its
Texas incarnation. The court worked through each possibility, rejecting the
possibility that either judgment was interlocutory or that one case could
have more than one final judgment. The court's ultimate conclusion was
that the first judgment, terminating parental rights, was the only final judg-
ment. Under Aldridge, all relief not granted in a final judgment is presumed
to be denied.220 The Azbills thus can claim a certain amount of notoriety as
being one of the few couples denied a divorce in an era of no-fault divorce,
and in a case in which there was more than enough fault to go around, to
boot. The opinion concludes with the observation that "[t]he Court ex-
presses no opinion on how or whether [the couple] may correct the error
regarding the divorce decree."' 221 One would imagine, however, that filing a
new divorce petition ultimately would be easier for the Azbills than taking
the trouble of finding out.
Several statutory changes are worth mentioning. First, the Family Code
now provides that when an agency interviews a child during an investigation
regarding the possibility of taking possession of the child, the agency must
make a reasonable effort within twenty-four hours to notify the child's par-
ents and legal guardians.222 Second, termination of parental rights after de-
214. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.10(a) (Vernon 1986).
215. 852 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, n.w.h.).
216. Id. at 102.
217. 860 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, n.w.h.).
218. See North East Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tex. 1966).
219. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 174.
220. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d at 898.
221. Azbill, 860 S.W.2d at 142.
222. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 17.031 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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nial of a prior petition is now expressly permitted when the circumstances of
the child, parent, managing conservator or possessory conservator have ma-
terially and substantially changed.223 Curiously, evidence from the former
hearing may be considered at the new hearing. 224 Finally, Texas now has
taken a clear position on the transracial adoption issue, with legislative
amendments designed to assure that race and ethnicity are not factors to be
considered in adoption, 225 placement for adoption,226 or placement in or re-
moval from a foster home.227 The clarification is welcome.
Texas adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)228
in an effort to minimize interstate custody disputes. Although the act has
been in effect for more than a decade, Texas courts are still working through
some of its jurisdictional ramifications. Several such cases came before
Texas appellate courts during this Survey period.
In Little v. Daggett229 the Texas Supreme Court ruled per curiam that a
paternity action dismissed for want of prosecution did not justify an end run
around the UCCJA where the mother and child had moved out of state. In
1990, Sherry Little filed a paternity action in Texas. She moved to Tennes-
see in 1992, and the court dismissed the paternity action for want of prosecu-
tion. In 1993, a little more than six months after Little left Texas, the
putative father brought a paternity action in Texas, seeking temporary visita-
tion. On mandamus, the Texas Supreme Court recognized that a court ren-
dering visitation orders retains authority to modify those orders,230 but held
that the dismissal removed this possible basis for jurisdiction.231
Abderholden v. Morizot 232 involves a somewhat more complicated situa-
tion. After a divorce in Travis County, Texas, the mother and child moved
to Arkansas. During a Christmas visit to Arkansas, the father became con-
cerned aboutthe child's behavior. He took the child to Texas, placed him in
a mental hospital, and filed a motion for a temporary restraining order in
Travis County district court. At the hearing, the parties agreed to partici-
223. Id. § 15.025(c)(1).
224. Id. § 15.025(d). Speaking of this provision, Professor Sampson states: "I wonder
what specific case generated this amendment." John J. Sampson, 1993 Legislation, supra note
1, at 57.
225. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.081 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (providing that, "[iln de-
termining the best interest of the child under Section 16.08 of this code, the court may not
deny or delay the adoption or otherwise discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity of the
child or the prospective adoptive parents").
226. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 47.041 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (providing that
"[tihe department, a county child-care or welfare unit, or a licensed adoption agency may not
deny or delay placement of a child for adoption or otherwise discriminate on the basis of the
race or ethnicity of the child or adoptive parents").
227. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 41.028 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (providing that
"[tlhe department may not prohibit or delay the placement of a child in foster care or remove a
child from foster care or otherwise discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity of the child or
the foster family").
228. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51-75 (Vernon 1986).
229. 858 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1993, orig. proceeding).
230. See, e.g., Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985); Hemingway v. Rob-
ertson, 778 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
231. Little, 858 S.W.2d at 369.
232. 856 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
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pate in treatment in Texas. The father then filed a motion to modify child
custody, also in Travis County. The court ultimately granted the motion
and named the father as managing conservator.
The mother appealed, challenging the district court's jurisdiction to mod-
ify custody. Since Arkansas was the child's new "home state" under the
UCCJA, the father relied on several arguments to defeat application of the
general rule. First, he argued that the mother's participation in the trial
constituted consent to jurisdiction. The Austin Court of Appeals pointed
out, however, that questions of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be settled
by consent.233 The court further noted that participation in the initial pro-
ceeding did not constitute a "written agreement of all the parties" 234 suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction.235 In addition, the father argued that the
UCCJA provides for "emergency jurisdiction" if the child is present in the
state and there is a "serious and immediate question" regarding the child's
welfare. 236 The Austin court ruled, however, that this jurisdiction would
not extend to permanent custody modifications. 237
Finally, the father argued that the Arkansas courts had declined to exer-
cise jurisdiction,238 thus leaving a clear field for the Travis County district
court. The Austin Court of Appeals disagreed. The Texas trial judge appar-
ently had telephone conversations with his Arkansas counterpart, but this
ground of jurisdiction was not pled.239 Nor was a hearing held by the Ar-
kansas judge or any communication from the Arkansas court "filed" in the
Texas proceeding. 240 Accordingly, the Austin Court of Appeals disap-
proved the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction.
Some similar questions arose in White v. Blake.241 The procedural and
factual background of the case was described by the Tyler appeals court as
"complex, ' 242 a marvel of understatement. What follows is a simplified ver-
sion of the critical facts. The parties divorced in Alabama. The mother, in
233. Id. at 832.
234. The Texas UCCJA provides, in part: "Except on written agreement of all the parties, a
court may not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify custody if the child and the party
with custody have established another home state unless the action to modify was filed before
the new home state was acquired." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.53(d) (Vernon 1986) (empha-
sis added).
235. Abderholden, 856 S.W.2d at 832.
236. Under the Texas UCCJA, a court has jurisdiction to modify child custody if "it is
necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subject to or threatened
with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or there is a serious and immediate ques-
tion concerning the welfare of the child." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.53(a)(3)(B) (Vernon
1986).
237. Abderholden, 856 S.W.2d at 833. In making this ruling, the court relied upon an
earlier decision to the same effect by the Amarillo Court of Appeals. See Garza v. Harney, 726
S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, orig. proceeding).
238. A Texas trial court is permitted to exercise jurisdiction if it is in the best interest of the
child and "another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state
[Texas] is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child." TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 1 l.53(a)(4)(B) (Vernon 1986).
239. Abderholden, 856 S.W.2d at 835.
240. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.57(i) (Vernon 1986) (requiring "filing").
241. 859 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, orig. proceeding).
242. Id. at 553.
1222 [Vol. 47
FAMILY LAW. PARENT AND CHILD
the process of losing a bitterly disputed case in which she claimed the father
was sexually abusing their child, moved with the child to Texas. After wait-
ing approximately eight months, she applied for a protective order in a
Texas court, claiming child abuse. The father appeared specially, but he
walked out of the hearing after the special appearance was denied. The
court proceeded to make findings of sexual abuse, arguably contrary to find-
ings already made in Alabama, and enjoined the father from having any
contact with the child.
The father later filed a habeas corpus petition seeking to enforce his Ala-
bama visitation rights; this petition was denied. The mother then filed a
motion to terminate parental rights. The father again filed a motion to dis-
miss on jurisdictional grounds, which was denied. The father then filed
three mandamus actions, challenging each of the trial court's rulings.
Although the mother and child had resided in Texas for more than six
months, this fact alone would not be dispositive since an action was pending
in Alabama at the time they moved. Nonetheless, under the UCCJA 243 and
the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,244 the Texas court had
"emergency jurisdiction" to address the allegations of sexual abuse. Since
the father chose not to participate once his special appearance was over-
ruled, he forfeited his chance to argue the merits of the charge. The habeas
corpus proceeding to enforce Alabama visitation rights was likewise unavail-
ing since Texas provides an exception for situations in which "there is a
serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child.1 245
The jurisdictional challenge to the Texas action to terminate parental
rights was another matter. The initial question was whether a termination
proceeding is a "custody proceeding" within the ambit of the UCCJA.246
The Tyler court disposed of arguably contrary authority from the Texas
Supreme Court2 4 7 and the Austin Court of Appeals 248 to the effect that a
proceeding to terminate parental rights is not a "child custody" proceeding
under Texas law, suggesting that the Texas Supreme Court's ruling should
be limited only to jurisdictional questions under a now-repealed bar on
"child custody" questions, and that the Austin opinion simply was wrong.
The court noted that the Austin ruling had been questioned by the courts of
several other states249 and that termination of parental rights necessarily in-
volves a reduction of custody-to zero.
The remaining question, as in Abderholden, was whether the Alabama
243. See supra note 236.
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii) (1988) (providing that a court may assume juris-
diction for child custody purposes if the child is present in the state and "it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreat-
ment or abuse").
245. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(d) (Vernon 1994).
246. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.52(3) (Vernon 1986).
247. See Richardson v. Green, 677 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1984).
248. See Williams v. Knott, 690 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
249. See, e.g., Souza v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 892, 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Gai-
ney v. Olivo, 373 S.E.2d 4, 5-6 (Ga. 1988); Foster v. Stein, 454 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Mich. App.
1990). The cases are cited in White, 859 S.W.2d at 562.
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court had conceded jurisdiction to Texas. Again, the Texas trial court relied
on telephone conversations with the Alabama judge, to the effect that the
case was a "hot potato" that was generating a lot of publicity and that the
Alabama judge would "like to see the matter resolved in any way it could be
resolved, and if that meant doing it here [in Texas], fine." '250 The Tyler
Court of Appeals ruled, however, that these statements did not satisfy the
requirements set out in the Texas UCCJA. As further illustration of the
danger of relying on judge-to-judge phone conversations, the court noted the
filing of a supplemental record containing a written order from the Alabama
court to the effect that an action was pending in Alabama, that the Texas
court's assumption of jurisdiction violated federal law, and that any order
entered by the Texas court would be regarded as null and void in Ala-
bama. 251 Accordingly, the Tyler Court of Appeals instructed the trial court
to dismiss the termination proceeding.
Custody-related sanctions also received some attention during the Survey
period.252 In Eason v. Eason253 the Houston Court of Appeals (14th Dis-
trict) affirmed the trial court's decision to strike pleadings and prohibit testi-
mony in a support-custody battle because the appellant had failed to pay
discovery-related ad litem's fees. In an unusually strong dissent filed nearly
a month after the majority opinion, Justice Draughn bemoaned the tendency
of courts to strike pleadings for discovery abuse without considering less
drastic alternatives, terming such actions "equivalent to a civil death pen-
alty." 254 He noted that an assessment of sanctions against the attorney
would have been appropriate, since by the attorney's own admission, the
problem was caused in part because "he had been fishing the bay" instead of
responding to discovery requests.255
Finally, the dissent noted a disturbing circularity to the proceedings as a
whole. The mother filed for increased child support and past due payments.
The father responded with a motion to change custody. The mother could
not pay her share of ad litem fees for discovery on the expanded case and
was therefore prevented from seeking past due child support in an amount
more than three times the unpaid ad litem fees: "Appellant thus found her-
self out of court because of lack of funds, and back in court facing a custody
battle which required more funds. All because she filed suit for money le-
gally due her."1256
250. White, 859 S.W.2d at 564-65 (quoting the trial judge's summary of the conversation as
set out in the statement of facts).
251. Id. at 565.
252. In addition to the case discussed in text, the Beaumont Court of Appeals also ruled in
Warchol v. Warchol, 853 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ), that the trial
court's power to assess attorney's fees as a sanction for filing a frivolous motion to modify is
reviewed on the same abuse of discretion standard. This otherwise unremarkable opinion is,
however, spiced up by an extended (and strained) analogy of a trial judge's job to that of a
symphony conductor. See id. at 169.
253. 860 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.).
254. Id. at 191 (Draughn, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 193.
256. Id. at 192.
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FAMILY LAW. PARENT AND CHILD
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court recently granted a writ of error on a
very interesting conservatorship-related issue. W. C. W. v. Bird,257 treated ex-
tensively in last year's Survey, 258 is a "negligent diagnosis" suit brought
against a testifying psychologist by a parent accused of child abuse. The
mother filed abuse charges when the managing conservator father was about
to move to Florida. The mother took the child to psychologist Bird, who
diagnosed abuse. According to summary judgment evidence, this was the
psychologist's first such case. 259 Nonetheless, the psychologist spent only
ten minutes with the child. While the diagnosis was based on the child's
supposed abuse by "Daddy," Bird did not consider that the child was stay-
ing on a temporary basis with the mother and her new common-law hus-
band. 260 Despite this shaky basis for an opinion, the psychologist filed an
affidavit accusing the father of sexual abuse and helped to convince a police
officer to file criminal charges. 26 1
After the father successfully defended himself against the abuse charges,
he sued Bird. Under chapter 34 of the Family Code, those who report child
abuse enjoy a general immunity from liability, including liability for testi-
mony in judicial proceedings. 262 Bird did not make such a report; in fact,
chapter 34 was not mentioned until oral argument in the Houston Court of
Appeals (1st District).263 The court of appeals also rejected a common law
immunity argument in holding that the privilege for participants in judicial
proceedings "does not preclude a suit for negligence."'264
The Houston Court of Appeals (1st District) recognized the difficulty of
applying the Texas Supreme Court's "balancing" analysis in Otis Eng'g
Corp. v. Clark,265 but the court ultimately concluded that psychologist Bird
and her employer owed a duty to the father. 266 The Texas Supreme Court's
decision in the case may well emerge as a major restatement of the law of
professional liability to third parties. 267 It is probably no accident that the
high court granted an application for writ of error in Bird on the same
257. 840 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.
1994).
258. See Paulsen, 1993 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 1527-28.
259. Bird, 840 S.W.2d at 52.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.03 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
263. Bird, 840 S.W.2d at 53.
264. This somewhat questionable ruling was discussed in more detail in last year's Survey.
See Paulsen, 1993 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 1528 n.148.
265. 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983).
266. Bird, 840 S.W.2d at 56.
267. As this Survey was going to press, the Texas Supreme Court issued a near-unanimous
opinion in this case. Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994). The court unequivocally
denied the possibility of recovery from a psychiatrist under these facts:
We hold that a mental health professional owes no professional duty of care to a
third party to not negligently misdiagnose a condition of a patient. We also hold
that a privilege exists for communication of an alleged child abuser's identity in




day2 68 that an application was granted in Thomas v. Pryor,269 a malpractice
claim by a disappointed beneficiary against an attorney who drafted a will
(on a pro bono basis).
268. See 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1248-49 (Sept. 13, 1993).
269. 847 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ granted, dism'd by agr.).
1226 [Vol. 47
